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PROVING AN 8(a) (3) VIOLATION:
THE CHANGING STANDARD
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act 1 is designed "to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational rights," 2 and provides
the primary statutory protection for employee organizational activities.
The keystone to the statutory plan is section 8(a) (3) ,3 which makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any . . . labor organization.
. ."
Because of both the legislative history of the provision and the

interpretive gloss placed upon it by the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts, proof of discriminatory motive has become the pivotal
element of the offense-even though "motive" is not even mentioned in the
act. It has been extremely difficult, however, to determine what sort of
proof is necessary to establish a section 8(a) (3) violation. This Comment
will address itself to this problem in light of the history of the provision
and the evolving case law in the Supreme Court. Specific consideration
will be given to plant closings and subcontracting, strike replacements,
bonus procedures, discharges and lockouts.
I. How MOTIVE GOT INTO

THE ACT

Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 4 was the
predecessor of section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.5 To prove
a violation of section 7(a), it was necessary to demonstrate that an employer
had discriminated against the complaining employees because of their union
activities or affiliations.6 Thus the National Labor Board, the agency
responsible for the administration of the section, insisted that "the Statute
161 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
2
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
4 Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed,
or issued under this title shall contain the following conditions: (1) that
employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
3

48 Stat 198 (1933).
5 See S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934), in 1 LEGisIATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABoR RELATIONS AcT OF 1935, at 3 (1935) [hereinafter cited as LEa.
HisT.] ; S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935), in 2 LEa. Hist. 2310; 79
CONG. REc. 2333, (1935), in 2 LEG. HIsT. 2433; H. RE. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
17 (1935), in 2 LEa. Hist. 2927; H. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935),
in 2 LEa. HIST. 2973; H. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935), in 2 LEa.
Hist. 3068.
6 See, e.g., Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 1 N.L.B. 14 (1933); Fifth
Ave. Coach Co., 2 N.L.B. 8 (1934).
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does not impair the privilege of the employer to discharge an employee
for infraction of company rules or for other reasons; it requires only that
in such discharges the employer shall not be motivated by the employee's
union membership or activity." 7 Proof of the employer's motive to break
up union organization and collective bargaining was therefore essential in
every allegation of discriminatory discharge or similar offense and such
proof became sufficient to establish guilt under section 7(a).8 Once this
discriminatory motive or anti-union animus was proven, the employer was
ordered to reinstate the employees to their former positions.9 Employers
soon found that they could successfully defend against claims under section
7(a) by providing persuasive evidence of a general economic cutback,
employee misconduct, breach of company rules, poor workmanship, incompetence or the like.' In situations where an employer established such
a legitimate cause for his act, the Board found it impossible to conclude
that the discharges were motivated by a desire to interfere with selforganization or to destroy the union in derogation of protected employee
rights under section 7(a).
Section 8(3) 1 of the NLRA was the culmination of congressional
concern with employer discrimination against union activity and adherents;
thus it "rounded out the idea expressed in section 7(a) of the [NIRA]
..
. .,,
The new provision was intended to delineate more precisely
than section 7(a) the types of employer conduct which would constitute
anti-union discrimination.' 3 Congressional debate on the new section emphasized that it was necessary to establish anti-union animus as the
motivating factor for the employer's conduct in order to prove a violation,' 4
thus continuing the rule which had developed under section 7 (a) of the
previous statute.
As a result of these clear expressions of legislative intent and historical
precedent, the NLRB immediately began to include discriminatory motive
in the allegation and proof of section 8(3) violations. 15 In the first case
decided by the Board, the discharge of five employees was held to be a
violation because the "motivating cause" of the firings was discouragement
7 Jersey City & Lyndhurst Bus Co.,
8 See cases cited note 6 supra.

2 N.L.B. 48, 49-50 (1934).

o See, e.g., Birtman Elec. Co., 2 N.L.B. 43 (1934); Chicago Motor Coach Co.,
2 N.L.B. 74 (1934).
I0 See, e.g., Calcasieu Sulphate Paper Co., 2 N.L.B. 22 (1934) ; American Stores,

2 N.L.B. 69 (1934).
1149 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
1279 CoNG. REc. 2333 (1935), in 2 LEG. HiST. 2433.
13 Id. at 3066; Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 SuPRzr COURT Rzv. 112
[hereinafter cited as Meltzer].
14 [A]nything that is in motive discrimination, either as to promotion, reduction of force, or discharge is unla-wful. This interpretation has been followed
consistently by the National Labor Board from the time of its establishment,
August 5, 1933, and by its successor, the National Labor Relations Board,

down to the present time.
79 CoNG. REc. 2333 (1935), in 2 LEG. HIsT. 2433.
15 See 1 NLRB Ax. REP. 77-84 (1936) ; 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 65 (1939).
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of union membership. Two employees, similarly fired, were held to have
no remedy because their "union membership or activity was not the
effective cause" for their discharge, and thus the requisite unlawful motive
was absent. 6 The first case to reach the Supreme Court which was decided
under the new act upheld the constitutionality of the legislation which
created the Board and affirmed the Board's determination of the employer's
7
"true purpose" in violating his employees' protected rights.' Investigation
into the employer's motive for his actions was held to be central to the
Board's case.' 8
To carry its burden of proof more easily, the NLRB soon began to
employ a weighing of the evidence test whereby the employer's discriminatory motive could be established on the strength of a general background
of anti-union hostility. 19 Toward the same end the Board began to make
use of a presumption of illegal motive; once a prima facie case of disparate
treatment between union and non-union adherents was demonstrated, the
resulting discouragement of union membership carried with it its own
proof of employer motive.2° The burden was then shifted to the employer
to explain and justify his actions.?'
Employers soon began to challenge the presumptive approach 22
especially after the Supreme Court in several cases refused to accept the
16 Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), enforced as modified,
91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'd as to modification, 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
17 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
18 The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may
not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect
to their self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the
Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with
the right of discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than
such intimidation and coercion.
Id. at 45-46; see 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 79-80 (1936).
'9 "Any antiunion activity by the employer tends to show that the employer discriminated against particular employees on that ground." 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 81
(1939); See Kentucky Firebrick Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 455, 462-68 (1937), enforced, 99
F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1938); 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 78-80 (1936); Ward, Proof of "Discrimination" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 7 GEo.WASH. L. REv. 797, 809-14
(1939). Such a loose proof of the violation has become increasingly unsatisfactory
to the courts. Evidence of general hostility and a showing of past anti-union animus
no longer supply the required proof of unlawful motive as to a specific discharge.
See, e.g., Beaver Valley Canning Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 429, 432-33 (8th Cir. 1964).
However, the Board has the authority to draw reasonable inferences of discriminatory
motive from evidence of anti-union hostility by the employer when it clearly demonstrates the specific acts and conduct upon which it bases its inferences and when these
supply substantial evidence of the unlawful motive. See, e.g., NLRB v. Schill Steel
Prods., Inc., 340 F.2d 568, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Wonder State Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
331 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1964).
20 For example: "The Board has frequently found persuasive evidence of discrimination in an unduly high percentage of union members or union leaders in a
series of discharges." 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 79 n.1 (1936).
21 See NLRB v. Kentucky Firebrick Co., 99 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1938) ; NLRB v.
Remington Rand Corp., 94 F.Zd 862, 872 (Zd Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576, 585
(1938); Lone Star Bag & Baggage Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 244 (1938); Scandore Paper
4 N.L.R.B. 910 (1938).
Box 2 Co.,
2
See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (dictum); 1 NLRB
ANN. REP. 78-80 (1937).
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Board tests, and reversed on the basis of faulty fact finding 24 The employers advanced evidence of excuse, just cause, and lack of unlawful
motive for their disparate treatment of union adherents. In cases where
these defenses were raised, motive grew to be a matter for more direct
evidence. The Board introduced evidence of anti-union animus which
included past discriminatory acts, statements by the employer betraying
his motives, disparity of treatment of other employees having similar
work records, failure to give warning before discharge, absence of
economic justification for the action, and credibility findings.24 Allegations of proper cause became the sine qua non of an effective defense,
with economic justification to establish lawful motivation most frequently
Gradually, the NLPB expanded the coverage of section 8(3)
advanced.2
beyond outright discharge to include "lay-off [s], refusal to reinstate, demotion, transfer, and refusal to re-employ, among the other classifications
of frequent conduct which, when coupled with anti-union motivation, con6
stitutes discrimination." 2
Proof of discriminatory motive, therefore, was believed to be a necesssary element in proof of section 8(3) violations by its framers, the NLRB,
the courts, and the parties to actions brought under that section. Direct
and circumstantial evidence of motive were consistently produced by the
Board as the major part of its proof. Employers countered with explanations of their conduct which would disprove any anti-union motives. This
remained the state of the law until 1954 when the first of a decade-long
line of crucial section 8(a) (3) 27 cases reached the Supreme Court. These
cases provide a fuller and more intense examination of the ingredients of an
offense under that section.
A. Section 8(a) (3), Motive and the Supreme Court: 1954-1963
A trilogy of cases consolidated under the name Radio Officers' Union
v. NLRB 2 began this analysis of section 8(a) (3). In the first case,2 9
the employer concurred in the union's reduction of seniority for a member
delinquent in dues payments. As a result, the employee was denied driving
2
3E.g., NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
2A See Burk Bros. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 588

(1941) ; 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 81-88 (1939).
2 See Ward, "Discrinnation" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 48

LJ. 1152, 1172, 1187-92 (1939).
Id. at 1172. Section 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1964), was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 61 Stat. 147. The provision
states that the Board shall not require the reinstatement of any employee who has
been suspended for "cause." Such an amendment further indicates the central position
of proof of motive in the discharge situation. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 61 HAxv. L. Ray. 1, 20-21 (1947).
27
In 1947, § 8 of the NLRA became § 8(a) and (b), with the introduction of
YAIE

26

employee and union unfair labor practices in part (b) of the section.

Section 8(3)

is now § 8(a) (3). 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
28 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
29

International Bhd. of Teamsters, 94 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1951).

(1964).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

870

[Vol.l14:866

assignments he otherwise would have received. The Board found that both
the union and the employer violated the act, but was reversed by the appellate court,30 which reasoned that although the employer was caused to
discriminate against the employee, the evidence was insufficient to support
a conclusion that union activity or membership would be encouraged or
discouraged by this conduct.
In the second case,31 the union had caused the employer to replace
a radio operator because he had not been referred through the union's
hiring hall. The collective bargaining agreement permitted the employer
a right of free selection in hiring so long as the applicant was a union
member in good standing. The Board found unfair labor practices against
both the union and the employer since, in causing the employee to be
discharged, they had discriminated against him and interfered with his
right to refrain from union participation. The Second Circuit granted
32
enforcement.
Finally, in the last of the three decisions,3 the Board found that the
employer violated sections 8(a) (1) 3- and (3) by granting certain retroactive wage increases and vacation benefits to employees who were union
members, while denying those benefits to nonunion employees. Although
there was no direct evidence of prounion motive, the Board held that such
disparate treatment was inherently discriminatory and encouraged union
adherence; thus it carried its own proof of unlawful motive. With slight
modifications not relevant here, the Second Circuit granted enforcement.35
In upholding the Board's decision in each case, the Supreme Court
defined crucial terms of the section and reaffirmed the necessity, in most
cases, of proving motive as an element of the offense. "Discrimination"
was broadly defined as disparate treatment; "involuntary reduction of
seniority, refusal to hire for available job, and disparate wage treatment"
based on union adherence were held to be discriminatory. 6 "Encouragement" became tendency to encourage, which could easily be inferred from
the conduct itself: "Subjective evidence of employee response . . . is not
required where encouragement . . . can reasonably be inferred from the

nature of the discrimination." 3 7 Such an inferential approach makes the
burden of proving the effect of the employer's conduct almost nonexistent
as an element of a section 8(a) (3) violation. Finally, "union membership"
was defined as any "participation in union activities" within the protected
8
concerted conduct of section 7.

30 NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 196 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1952).
81
Radio Officers' Union, 93 N.L.R.B. 1523 (1951).
3
2 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1952).
33 Gaynor News Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 299 (1952), enforced as viodified, 197 F.2d 719
(2d Cir. 1952).
3449 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (1) (1964).
35 NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1952).
36 347 U.S. at 39.
37 Id.
3

at 50-51.

8Id. at 40; §7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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While specific evidence of intent"3 to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization was held unnecesary where the employer's
40
the
conduct inherently encouraged or discouraged protected activity,
Court permitted the Board to apply a presumption of unlawful intent or
motive-based on the traditional rule that one intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of one's acts-only in situations where the discrimination was based solely upon union activity. 41 This presumption was apparently rebuttable,4 but where the differential treatment was clearly based
on union adherence, a rebuttal would be virtually impossible.4 However,
when the union leader was discharged and the employer claimed that his
work was unsatisfactory, there would remain the problem of determining
upon which factor the employer based his action. In virtually every case,
a complex of motives stimulates the employer and explains his actions.
Discrimination which is based solely upon union activity is rare.
Radio Officers' has been interpreted as saying that, in order to take
advantage of the virtually conclusive presumption of violation offered by
the Court, the Board must demonstrate that encouragement or discouragement of union membership is the natural and foreseeable consequence of
the employer's decision to discharge and that the sole criterion for discrimination was union membership." By implication, therefore, in all other
cases involving section 8(a) (3), the Board must establish the true intent
or real motive of the employer as an element of the offense. Under the
39 Over the years, use of the word "intent?' has become interchangeable with
"motive!' when used in § 8(a) (3) cases. It is too late to attempt to disentangle them,
and this Comment makes no attempt to do so. See Meltzer 93 n.23; Comment, 32
U. CHI. L. REv. 124, 128-29 (1964).
40 347 U.S. at 45. In a much later application of this standard, NLRB v. Great
Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), a showing of foreseeability was
rejected when it replaced a showing of motive, which was held necessary for proof
of a violation in a lockout case. "Foreseeability is not the equivalent of discriminatory
motivation." Id. at 694.
41347 U.S. at 44-46; see, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284
F.2d 74, 82-83 (9th Cir. 1960).
42 347 U.S. at 55-57 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43 Such a defense was attempted in NLRB v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F.2d 465
(9th Cir. 1938), and was rejected. The employer claimed that having union and
nonunion men working side by side created friction and impaired production.
44 In Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 186-87 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the natural and foreseeable inference and the presumption
of intent were applied to enable the Board to make a finding of § 8(a) (3) violation.
The appellate court required proof of discrimination based upon union membership
and insisted upon a showing that such discrimination was deliberately designed to
encourage union membership, refusing to accept the Board's use of the Radio Officers'
approach. Because the employer was motivated by a complex of motives, including
in this situation a desire to preserve amicable relationships with the union whose
demands forced the employer to violate § 8(a) (3), the court required firm proof of
motive. See Comment, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 273, 277-79 (1965) ; Comment, 32 U. CHL
L. REv. 124, 131-34 (1964). When there are mixed motives and dual grounds for
apparent discrimination, existence of a lawful basis for the act is no defense to proof
of unlawful motive, unless the discharge or conduct was based solely on the lawful
ground. See NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 1964); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1960). "[T]o have a
perfectly good motive genuinely followed is not enough if, on the facts, the motivation
was twofold, with one being a purpose to eliminate the union." NLRB v. American
Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965).

872

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.114:866

Radio Officers' analysis, there are three separate steps in proving a violation. The first is the proof of the employer's act and the determination
that the conduct discriminates for or against union adherents or those contemplating union affiliation. Second, the Board may infer from these facts,
using its expertise, whether or not this act naturally encourages or discourages union membership or other protected activity. Third, if the
Board so infers, it may then presume the existence of unlawful motive,
on the theory that one intends the natural and probable consequences of
his acts.
Because the Court prohibited conduct which foreseeably or inherently
discouraged union activity without prescribing guidelines for determining
when such conduct occurs and without explaining the basis for abandoning
the requirement of proof of unlawful motive, "the Radio Officers' decision
has been cited both for the proposition that a finding of improper motive is
necessary under section 8(a) (3) and for the proposition that it is not." 45
Section 8(a) (3) received its second extensive examination in Local
357, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB.46 An association of employers
had agreed by contract with the union to hire casual employees only
through the union's hiring hall. The agreement specified that referral
would be on the basis of seniority and without regard to an applicant's
union membership. Despite this, the Board held that the arrangement
lacked certain specified safeguards,4 7 and that the exclusive hiring hall was
therefore per se discriminatory, with the required unlawful motive implicit
in the plan. The circuit court affirmed, but refused to enforce the Board's
order for dues reimbursement by the union.48
The Supreme Court first searched the legislative history of the act
to determine if Congress bad condemned hiring halls. Finding no such
condemnation, the Court reasoned that exclusive hiring halls could not
judicially be declared a per se unfair labor practice.49 Thus, there could be
no inherently discriminatory motive attributed to an employer who set up
such an arrangement. The Court further concluded that, despite the
natural encouragement of union membership which the Board held inhered
to this plan, it was the "true purpose" or "real motive" which controlled
the case. The Court therefore denied the Board the use of the Radio
Officers' presumption, which the Board had assumed applied to this situation. Most crucial to the Court's holding, however, was its finding that
the contract specifically forbade discrimination against nonmembers; for
since the NLRB failed to produce substantial evidence of unlawful motive,
the fact that there was no discrimination compelled reversal of the Board's
45 Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort To Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Cxi. L. RIEV. 735, 745 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Getman].
46365 U.S. 667 (1961).
47 Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1629, 1630 (1958).
4
SLocal 357, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 646 (D.C.
Cir. 1960).
49 365 U.S. at 673-74.
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action. No amount of encouragement or discouragement could turn a
nondiscriminatory action into a violation of the section. Discrimination
does not have to be narrowly defined as differential treatment between
nonunion and union employees. Rather, a broader definition designed to
encompass situations where employer action was taken in response to union
activity, as differentiation without sufficient reason or arbitrary and in50
vidious disparate treatment, has long been accepted by the courts.
If, under one of these definitions, discrimination had been found,
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion would have correctly stated the
holding of the case: an employer can make business decisions which foreseeably and naturally discourage union membership so long as they are
"unmotivated by an intent to discourage union membership or protected
concerted activities.

.,"1

Certainly the

Court should not have

stopped its examination where it did; the actual administration of the hiring
hall should have been examined for evidence of discrimination and discriminatory motive. 52 The balancing approach advocated in this Comment
would then have been appropriate. Under this analysis, the finding of a
violation turns upon an evaluation of the disputed conduct in terms of
legitimate employer or union purposes. The hiring ball could be justified
by the employer and union because of the nature of the industry and the
workers needed, the improved efficiency of hiring, and similar arguments.
The injury to employee interests and their right to refrain from union
activities supply the countervailing considerations. Such frank and exposed
evaluation of legitimate economic weapons in terms of the interests and
necessities at issue is a particularly appropriate function for an expert body
&oSee, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945). The
controversy as to the position and definition of "discrimination" in the section is still
very much alive. Some commentators argue that a finding of discrimination is the
central element in proof of a § 8(a) (3) violation, with motive being secondary or
inferrable from such a finding. See Meltzer 100; Comment 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 124,
142-43 (1964).
&1365 U.S. at 679; see NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.
1953); Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947).
52 In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan recognized the validity of this
argument, but narrowed the applicability of the Radio Officers' presumption. 365
U.S. at 677-85. He denied that the act authorized the Board to interfere significantly
with conduct justified by nondiscriminatory economic considerations and searched the
legislative history to determine the balance struck between protection of employee
freedom with respect to union activity and the employer's privilege to make nondiscriminatory business decisions which discourage union membership. With the
requirement that discriminatory treatment be shown, the legislators struck the balance
in favor of the employer's prerogatives. In Mr. Justice Harlan's view, to make out an
offense, the Board must show discrimination in addition to encouragement or discouragement of union membership. This analysis is not very helpful for this is what
the act clearly directs. It would be unreasonable to find a § 8(a) (3) violation in the
absence of both unlawful motive and disparate treatment. But when such discriminatory conduct is shown, the act directs the Board to investigate the conduct for evidence
of a violation. It is here that the balancing analysis is relevant and appropriate for
an analysis of reasonable and available alternatives open to the employer which would
fulfill the legitimate business purposes contemplated, yet insulate employees from the
detrimental effects of discouragement of union participation.
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operating in a limited field like the NLRB.63 Thus an absence of significant business justification for the employer's actions which, as determined by the Board, foreseeably and in fact did discourage union membership, should carry the Board's burden of proof of a section 8(a) (3)
violation and dispense with proof of motive. For example, in Local 357,
the balance would fall in favor of the employees' protected rights&" Similarly, where the fact finder made a determination that the employer had
evaluated alternative means of reaching his legitimate ends and found
evidence of the employer's business interest in an act which damaged
protected activity and discouraged union membership, proof of improper
motive would be necessary to support a finding of an 8(a) (3) violation.r
Lest the Board feel that it had to find actual evidence of discriminatory
motive as a result of the majority opinion in Local 357, the Court permitted
and affirmed the Board's function of balancing the value of a particular
economic weapon against its impact on protected concerted activities in
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.5 6 in 1963. In that case, the union had struck
over a dispute on the terms of a new contract. Seeking to maintain operations, as it had the right to do,5 7 the employer had promised all strike replacements twenty years seniority in the plant. When the strike ended,
the union returned to work and signed a contract recognizing the replacements' twenty year seniority. After several months, the company reduced
the number of its employees; the first to be laid off were the former strikers
and union adherents since their comparative seniority was much less than
the replacements' new tenure. The union filed section 8(a) (3) charges
which were sustained by the NLRB.5 8 The Board reasoned that, regardless of the employer's motives or legitimate business needs in granting
superseniority to the replacements and then laying off the former strikers,
the grant of such superseniority unlawfully discriminated against strikers
who had exercised their right of concerted activity and affected the future
vitality of the union. Thus, on balance, the Board felt that this economic
weapon should not be available to the employer.
The Third Circuit denied enforcement,. 9 citing Radio Officers' and
Local 357 for the proposition that the Board must make specific findings
of the employer's discriminatory motive to sustain a section 8(a) (3) violation. The court held that, lacking substantial evidence of such a motive,
the Board could not successfully request enforcement of its order. While
53The NLRB handles over 15,000 unfair labor practice charges each year. See
29 NLRB ANN. R Pa. 7 (1965). Possessing such first hand and continuous contact
with labor problems and relationships, the agency is particularly sensitive to the
effects of certain labor practices and weapons.
54
For other examples cited by Mr. Justice Harlan as applying the balancing
test, see cases cited at 365 U.S. 680. See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 229 (1963).
55
See NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1965).
56373 U.S. 221 (1963).
57 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
5Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 621 (1961).
59 UEW v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1962).
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conceding the Board's authority to draw inferences from circumstantial
evidence of anti-union animus and motivation, the court maintained that
the legitimate purpose served by the employer's tactic of offering superseniority to strike replacements-to maintain production during the strike
-could not be declared illegal despite the injury to union activity. Thus,
absent evidence of the employer's desire to discourage union membership,
the Board could not hold that such conduct violated section 8(a) (3), even
if it foreseeably accomplished that end.
The Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the Board's reasoning.
The fact that the employer was motivated by clearly legitimate business
reasons was found not to be dispositive of the case.60 "In a detailed analysis
of the Board's assessment of the values and effects of superseniority, 61 the
Supreme Court gave explicit approval to the Board's use of a balancing
test, permitting it to "weigh . . . the interests of employees in concerted

activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in a
particular manner and [to balance]

.

.

. in the light of the Act and its

policy the intended consequences upon employee rights against the business
ends to be served by the employer's conduct." u
In the specific case of superseniority, the process was clearly
articulated:
Because the employer's interest [in maintaining operations] must
be deemed to outweigh the damage to concerted activities caused
by permanently replacing strikers does not mean it also outweighs
the far greater encroachment resulting from super-seniority in
addition to permanent replacement.

.

.

. [To extend the hold-

ing of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938),
permitting replacements, to the present case] would require us to
set aside the Board's considered judgment that the Act and its
underlying policy require, in the present context, giving more
weight to the harm wrought by super-seniority than to the interest
of the employer in operating its plant during the strike by utilizing
this particular means of attracting replacements.63
B. Scope of Judicial Review
The use of a balancing approach raises interesting questions of the
scope of judicial review. While these problems are more sharply focussed
by the Court's most recent handling of section 8(a) (3) cases, "4 it is ap60 373 U.S. at 228-30.
61 The Court thoroughly explored the depth of the NLRB's investigation and its
conclusions about the use of superseniority as an employer weapon. Ibid.
62Id.
W

at 228.

Id. at 232. See also id. at 235-36.

6
4Compare American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(Board's role as balancer summarily approved), with 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (Supreme
Court opinion in the same case emphatically rejected the Board's function of arbiter
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propriate to raise the issue here. If the Board finds that the employer's
interest in his choice of action is legitimately motivated and leads to reasonable business ends, but that it is outweighed by the substantial damage
done to union membership by the conduct, does a reviewing court have
the authority to make a fresh evaluation, using its own scales to strike a
contrary balance? Normally, if the Board's factual findings are sup05
ported by substantial evidence on the whole record, if its rationale is not
6
arbitrary, and if it articulates its reasoning, its findings may not be disturbed and its decision will be enforced. 67 On questions of law, the courts'
responsibility similarly involves a decision on "whether the Board's decision has 'warrant in the record' and 'a reasonable basis in law.' "68
of the kinds of economic weapons available to employers and unions). See also NLRB
v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) ; Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964).
65 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
66
See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 196-97 (1941).
67 See Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), rez'd sub nom. Truck
Drivers Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 89, 96
In this case, the Supreme Court recognized the limited judicial review
(1957).
permissible when the NLRB had exercised the function of evaluating conflicting
legitimate interests, a function which Congress committed primarily to the Board.
353 U.S. at 96-97. When the Board approved lockouts by the nonstruck members
of a multi-employer bargaining unit in response to a strike against one of its members,
the Court deferred to the Board's evaluation of the tactic and its determination that
the employer's strong interest in the integrity of the unit outweighed the harm naturally
accomplished to the employees' union adherence by its use. Less deference and more
judicial scrutiny were evident in a bargaining context just three years later, however,
when a union engaged in such harassing tactics in support of its bargaining demands
as slowdowns, quickie strikes, misconduct and the like. NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). The Board had balanced the interests and looked to the
"relative effectiveness of the parties' economic weapons and defined their legality to
prevent what it judged would create an imbalance of power." Summers, Labor Law
in the Supreme Court; 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 73 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
the Court had accepted the Board's balancing
Summers]. Where in Buffalo Linea,
judgment and limited judicial review, now it broadened its inquiry and conducted its
own analysis on its own scales, criticizing the Board for "assuming a general power
to regulate weapons available to the employer and unions in a bargaining context."
361 U.S. at 490. See also id. at 492, 497-98. The Court here declared that Congress
intended no such role for the Board. Three years later, in Erie Resistor Corp. v.
NLRB, 373 U.S. 221 (1963), the Court apparently had second thoughts and once
again approved such a role and balancing function for the NLRB. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
68 Local 9735, UMW v. NLRB, 258 F.2d 146, 151 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Burger,
J., dissenting), citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1941).
Admittedly, questions of law, if the decision to apply the balancing analysis is such
a question, are susceptible to broader judicial scrutiny than questions of fact, for,
according to § 10 of the APA, "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law." The act excepts from such broad review actions "committed to
agency discretion" and limits review to "abuse of discretion" in such situations.
Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
Professor Jaffe cogently argues: "A court, therefore, must decide as a 'question
of law' whether there is 'discretion' in the premises, and once the discretion is established, its exercise if 'reasonable" is free of control." JAFFE, JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINIsTRATIVE AcroN

570 (1965).

See generally, id. at 546-92.

Before the recent lockout cases where the Court apparently determined that the
decision to apply the balancing analysis to § 8(a) (3) cases and results obtained from
its use were neither limited by review under standards for questions of fact nor questions of law, see note 64, infra, the use of the balancing test was deemed well within the
NLRB's discretionary function and conclusions drawn from such application narrowly
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The limited judicial review sanctioned under these standards was not
followed where the Board began to tread on the toes of "management
prerogatives" such as subcontracting, plant closings, bargaining lockouts,
and replacement of striking or locked-out employees.0 9 When the Board
found violations of section 8(a) (3) in these areas, the courts undertook
an independent evaluation and balancing analysis of their own.70 An
illustration of this development was provided in NLRB v. Lassing.71
When the employer considered that the union's organization of his employees would lead to increased costs, he eliminated three jobs, whose
former occupants brought 8(a) (3) charges. Denying enforcement of the
NLRB's determination of violation, the court reasoned:
[T]he advent of the union was a new economic factor which necessarily had to be evaluated by the respondent [employer] as a part
of the overall picture pertaining to cost of operations.
There is no evidence [of] . . . anti-union background.

The change was made because of reasonably anticipated increased
costs, regardless of whether this increased cost was caused by
the advent of the Union or by some other factor entering into
the picture." 72
Certainly the employer's discharge of the union adherents had the requisite
effect here, which, when coupled with the discriminatory nature of the
action, offered sufficient support for the Board's conclusion to warrant
affirmance. Instead, finding insufficient proof of anti-union motive, the
Court reversed the balance struck by the Board; it could have affirmed just
as easily. 73
reviewable under the traditional tests of reasonableness. NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
Cf. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S.
264, 269 (1956) ; Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954) ; Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 743 (1945); Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 76 (Zd
Cir. 1964). The courts should limit their review to applying the Hearst standard of
"warrant in the record" and "a reasonable basis in law."
09 Perhaps application of the balancing equation is not susceptible to the law-fact
review dichotomy, but is, instead, a different type of finding. The Supreme Court
has maintained, in NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965), and in
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 315-18 (1965), that the review is
not of a question of fact, but of a judgment as to the proper balance to be struck
between conflicting interests and thus one of interpreting the fundamental policy of
the act. Therefore, the Board's analysis in support of its conclusion has been subjected to full, independent judicial review. See Meltzer 103 & nn.71-72. This analysis,
enabling the fullest possible judicial review could be made in virtually all types of
Board decisions. Its judgment here is no different from the usual fact-law type of
analysis.
70 See note 59 supra.
71284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961); accord, NLRB
v. Dale Indus., Inc., 355 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1966).
,2284 F.2d at 783.
73 Similarly, an employer's interest in efficient operations permits him to discharge
employees who refuse to cross a picket line. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B.
1545 (1962), aff'd sub itom. Local 79, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).

878

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.l14:866

C. The Court Attempts an End Run
Intervening between Erie Resistor and the most recent Supreme Court
attempts to clarify the elements necessary for a section 8(a) (3) finding
was NLRB v. Burnup & Sims,74 a case having potentially broad implications for the area. In that case, two employees began to organize the employees in the plant in which they were working. A superintendent was
told by another employee that the organizers had threatened to dynamite
the plant if the union was not recognized. Because of these alleged statements, the employer discharged the two union adherents. In fact the
statements were never made, and the Board held that the employer's honest
belief that there were such threats was no defense. The Board found that
the discharges, even if unmotivated by a desire to discourage union activity,
were discriminatory and therefore violated section 8(a) (3) and, derivatively, section 8(a) (1).7 5 The appellate court disagreed that section
8(a) (3) could be violated without proof of the employer's improper motive,
and held that the employer's honestly mistaken belief was a complete
defense to the section 8(a) (3) charges. Nevertheless, the court ordered
backpay for the period between the date that the employees were laid
off and the date that they were finally discharged.
In a two page explanation, the Supreme Court reversed both the
Board and the lower court. Recognizing the danger of a flat affirmance of
the Board's opinion without a full investigation into the ramifications of its
approach, the Court declined to reach the section 8(a) (3) issue. Instead
the Court moved directly to an independent examination of the discharges
under section 8(a) (1), and held that that section can be transgressed, regardless of the employer's defenses and motives, when the employer's
conduct interferes with the concerted activity protected by section 7 of the
act.76 Finding a section 8(a) (1) violation under this approach, the Court
ordered the traditional section 8(a) (3) remedy of reinstatement with backpay. To limit the impact of the decision, the Court accepted the Board's
position and narrowed its application to those cases in which (1) the
discharged employee was engaged in a protected activity at the time of the
discharge; (2) the employer knew the activity was protected; (3) the
basis of the discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course
of that activity; and (4) the employee was in fact not guilty of that misconduct. It is questionable whether lower courts and the Board will
confine the application of this decision within these narrow bounds.
"This decision represents the first case involving an unfair labor
practice in which the Supreme Court has imposed liability for backpay
on an employer without regard to his intent to perform any element of the
74 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
75 137 N.L.R.B. 766 (1962), enforced as modified, 322 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1963).
7661 Stat 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964); cf. Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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offense." 77 It thus poses serious questions about the future of section
8(a) (1). Under the Burnup & Sims formula, in any situation in which
the necessity of proving motive might prove too rigorous a burden to
sustain, violation of section 8(a) (1) may be proved simply by showing
"interference" with protected activities. Thus the Board could obtain
enforcement of a reinstatement with backpay order and section 8(a) (3)
would become a dead letter; for "conceivably the Board could proceed
under section 8(a) (1) in any case in which a violation of section 8(a) (3)
is not clear." 78 This would be of crucial significance, as section 8(a) (1) is
a provision under which the Board's balancing tests have gained total ac79
ceptance and application.
Instead of applying section 8(a) (1) in conjunction with other subsections of section 8(a) and viewing its violation as a derivative offense8 0
in most situations, Burnup & Sims gave the section new dimensions as an
independent offense."' The Court could and should have avoided this
construction by candid acceptance of the balancing approach under section
8(a) (3). Using this approach, the Court could have concluded that the
effect of firing two union leaders upon false grounds of good cause outweighed the employer's interest in maintaining discipline and his position
of authority in the plant by refusing reinstatement. s2 Instead the Court
opened a channel through which the Board could evade the sometimes
onerous task of evaluating a complex of motives and excuses in order to
establish an unfair labor practice. The Court attempted to narrow this
channel by limiting the application of section 8(a) (1) and its backpay
remedy to the facts of the case. It would seek to narrow it still further
in the lockout cases discussed below.

II. THE

IMPACT OF THE CouRT's LATEST WORD

After Burnup & Sinms, the following situation existed: where an employer allegedly discriminated against his unionized employees and thereby
discouraged the exercise of protected union activity, it was first necessary
to examine his motives for the act. If sufficient evidence of anti-union
77

Note, 65 CoLum. L. Rv. 537, 539 (1965).

Getman 756-57, 761; see Meltzer 112-17. Compare Gibbs Corp., 124 N.L.R.B.
1320 (1959), with Farmer's Coop. Marketing Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 1 (1963).
79 See 380 U.S. at 268-69; NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d
Cir. 1963) ; Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Feb. 15, 1966) ; General
Elec.80Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (Feb. 15, 1966). See also Meltzer 114-15.
Where a finding of bad faith refusal to bargain is made, the offense necessarily
interferes with the employees' rights to collective protected activity under § 7, and thus
is a violation of §8(a) (1) as well. See, e.g., NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312
U.S. 426 (1941); Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1940).
See generally Getman 758-61.
81 A possible means of limiting the ramifications of Burnup & Sims, in addition
to limiting its application to the exact factual situation which existed in that case,
is to apply the requirement of a finding of discriminatory motive to that section as
well as to § 8(a) (3). See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965);
NLRB v. D'Armigene, Inc., 353 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1965).
8 See Meltzer 113.
78
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motive was adduced, normally legitimate business conduct became violative
of section 8(a) (3). If no strong evidence of unlawful motive could be
produced, it was still possible that the Board might establish a violation
under the section 8(a) (3) balancing equation. Thus if the employer's
interest in operating his business in a certain way was found to be outweighed by the tendency of his actions to discourage union membership
by the discrimination practiced, the Board might find a section 8(a) (3)
violation and order reinstatement with backpay. Moreover, if the Board's
order was denied enforcement, either because the reviewing court disagreed with the Board's evaluation under the balancing equation and
instead substituted its own scales in an independent evaluation, or because
it refused to find a section 8(a) (3) violation absent a finding of employer
anti-union motive, or because it judged the conduct at issue not inherently
discriminatory and thus presumptively not motivated by anti-union animus,
the Board might rely upon section 8(a) (1) to obtain the same remedy.P
This remained the tangled state of the law until the Supreme Court was
faced with the results of the Board's application of the balancing approach
in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 8 and NLRB v. Brown Food Store 15
in 1965.
Following its decisions that certain forms of lockouts must be withdrawn from the employer's arsenal of coercive bargaining weapons in
order to preserve some degree of bargaining equality,8 6 the Board in
American Ship Building held that absent reasonable grounds to fear a
strike, a lockout by the employer when his negotiations with the union
reached an impasse was an unlawful offensive lockout.87 Such bargaining
lockouts fell into the prohibited category by interfering with the union's
right to bargain collectively and by discouraging union participation. The
Board held that evidence of discriminatory motive was not necessary to
establish a violation in this situation. 8 The court of appeals, applying
what it considered to be the technique and teachings of the earlier cases,
deferred to the Board's primary responsibility for balancing conflicting
legitimate interests in the absence of substantial proof of discriminatory
motive.8 9 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the bargaining
lockout "is not demonstrably so destructive of collective bargaining that
the Board need not inquire into employer motivation .... ,,90 and, instead
83 See Welch Scientific Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Lorben Corp.,
146 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964), enforcenent denied, 345 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1965).
84380 U.S. 300 (1965).
85 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
86 Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961); Betts Cadillac
Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951) ; Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
87142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963). See generally Getman 735; Meltzer; Summers;
Comment; 114 U. PA. L. REV. 366 (1966).
88 See Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 917 (1959).
89 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
go 380 U.S. at 310.
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of remanding for the Board's inquiry, made an independent evaluation of
the effect of the bargaining lockout. Disapproving the balance struck by
the Board, the Court held that use of this weapon by the employer was
legitimate and the injury slight. Strongly criticizing the Board for functioning "as an arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties may
use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands," 'I the Court
ignored the fact that the NLRB had been fulfilling this role since its
92
inception.
The Board had judged that use of the offensive bargaining lockout
would tip the scales too far in the employer's favor and would defeat the
act's goal of placing the employer and the union on roughly equal terms
at the negotiation table. The Court rejected not only this conclusion but
also the position that the Board could attempt such an equation, terming
it an "unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions
[which are] properly made by Congress." 93 The Court further stated:
"[T] he Act's provisions are not indefinitely elastic, content-free forms to
be shaped in whatever manner the Board might think best conforms to the
proper balance of bargaining power." 9 4 Yet the reading given the earlier
cases discussed above leads one to the conclusion that it was just such a
role under section 8(a) (3) which the Court contemplated for the Board.
In rejecting both the section 8(a) (1) and (3) findings of the Board,
the Court maintained that a finding of unlawful motive was required under
either section except in situations where the
practices . . . are inherently so prejudicial to union interests

and so devoid of significant economic justification that no specific
evidence of intent to discourage union membership or other antiunion animus is required. In some cases it may be that the employer's conduct carries with it an inference of unlawful intention
so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's
protestations of innocent purposes. 6
91Id. at 317, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98

(1960).

92 See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 42 (1964). While the
preelection context, where the Board's balancing function has been most frankly
acknowledged, is distinguishable from the collective bargaining situation, the Board
has exercised its balancing functions in both situations. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963). But see NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-500 (1960).
93 380 U.S. at 318.
9
4 Id. at 310.
95 See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964); NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
96380 U.S. at 311. See also NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 286
(1965). The Court thus failed to acknowledge the applicability of Erie Resistor's
analysis where the employer's conduct has a degree of economic justification yet causes
grave discouragement of union membership. Certainly where the employer's choice
of action is "devoid" of economic justification, even the oldest of tests allows the
Board to presume unlawful motive and sustain a § 8(a) (3) charge. See Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 46-49 (1954).
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Under this interpretation, the Board must make findings of discriminatory
motive in all other situations involving allegations of section 8(a) (1) or
(3) behavior. Thus, even where the union membership and activity is
crippled by the employer's acts, and this result is both natural and foreseeable, a supportable claim of legitimate business justification will prevent
the conduct from being construed as a violation of section 8(a) (3) if there
is no proof of motive.9 7 If the Board is to function as an effective adjudicatory body utilizing the full range of its expertise, such a confining
philosophy must be abandoned for it indisputably prevents that agency
from maintaining industrial peace by allocating economic weapons in order
to achieve a balance of power between the employer and union.
The Court's justification for its reaction against loosening the requirements of proof for establishing section 8(a) (3) violations was succinctly
set forth: "Such a construction of 8(a) (3) is necessary if due protection
is to be accorded to the employer's right to manage his enterprise." 98 In

their concurring opinion, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Goldberg
correctly noted that this rule departed substantially from the spirit of the
earlier line of cases investigated above.99 They concurred because there
was no substantial evidence (not even a "scintilla") to support the Board's
finding that the employer's fear of a strike was unreasonable; thus precedent
justified the finding of a lawful defensive lockout here.0 0 These Justices
submitted that where the Board is unable to bring forth substantial evidence
of the employer's unlawful motive, it must determine whether the legitimate
economic interests of the employer justify his interference with the protected activities of his employees. This sophisticated and sensitive balancing process, they concluded, was committed by Congress "primarily to
the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review." ''
This approach also coincides with that taken by Mr. Justice White.
In a well-reasoned concurring opinion, he joined in the result, but demonstrated that legitimate interest motivated the employer's use of this economic weapon.' 0 2 Since the employees were laid off for lack of work,
(although the lack of business was directly attributable to the employer's
notification of clients that a strike was likely) no violation could be found.
The Board's function is to evaluate the strengths and effects of the com97
"[W]e have consistently construed the section to leave unscathed a wide range
of employer actions taken to serve legitimate business interests in some significant
fashion, even though the act committed may tend to discourage union membership
.[citing Mackay's replacement rule]." 380 U.S. at 311. Similarly, the decisions
in American Ship Building and Brozn Food Store indicate the future direction of

the section.
9
8Id.at 311.

99 Id.at 338-42.

1oo Id. at 327-35; see text accompanying notes 170-85 infra.
101 380 U.S. at 341, quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)

(Buffalo Linen).
102 380 U.S. at 318-27. Contrary to the majority, Mr. Justice White found no use
of the lockout here since lack of work created the need for the lay off. Thus there was
no refusal to furnish available work to the employees, a characteristic of the lockout.
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peting interests of the employer and union; when it fails to articulate and
display the considerations which moved it to strike the particular balance,
the reviewing court may properly reverse and remand. Here, the Board
relied on a mechanistic dichotomy between offensive and defensive lockouts
instead of a reasoned assessment of the conflicting interests at stake and a
3
rational connection between the facts found and the balance struck.1'
Mr. Justice White recognized that in fact the test is one of choosing among
a complex of motives and assigning weights to the strengths of the interests
involved. "The balance or accommodation of 'conflicting legitimate interests' in labor relations does not admit of a simple solution and myopic focus
on the true intent or motive of the employer .

.

...

104

This is a sophisticated and realistic approach to the actualities of
industrial relations. Requiring an employer to examine his prerogatives
and interests to determine if he can accomplish his legitimate business
goals in alternative ways which are not so damaging to a union and its
protected activity is hardly an outrageous burden. Such a reasoned calculation by an employer will often prevent labor disputes before they occur.
If he sees no feasible alternatives to his selected conduct and determines
that the goal is a necessary one, he should be able to convince the Board
of this fact. This approach restores proof of motive to its proper role
in finding a section 8(a) (3) violation, expunges the confused evasions
of the courts and the Board, and permits an exposed and articulated
weighing of the values placed upon the economic weapons of the employer
and the union. It also permits the agency and the courts to react flexibly
to new labor situations as they occur without being bound by superficial
05
application of settled rules of conduct.Y
Into the balancing equation advocated here must go a determination
of the effect of the employer's conduct upon his employees, for if the
discouragement or encouragement is relatively slight, it should not shift
the scales against the employer's chosen course of action. As Erie Resistor
held, when superseniority is added to maintenance of operations during a
strike by replacing the striking employees, the cumulative effect is too
103 But cf. Getman 746 n.42.
104 380

U.S. at 325 (concurring opinion).

105 Compare the Court's statement in American Ship Building ('we think that

the Board construes its functions too expansively when it claims general authority
to define national labor policy by balancing the competing interests of labor and management.") 380 U.S. at 316, with dictum in Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. at 289, to the
effect that since the employer's conduct did not have a great tendency to discourage
union membership and since preservation of the multi-employer unit was the legitimate
end sought, no violation could be found. (The Court stated: "When the resulting
harm to employee rights is thus comparatively slight, and a substantial and legitimate
business end is served, the employers' conduct is prima facie lawful. Under these
circumstances the finding of an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3) requires a showing of improper subjective intent.") Ibid. To reconcile these views, it appears that
it is improper for the Board to utilize the balancing approach but proper for the
Court to do so. Who else but the Board is to determine when the injury to employee
rights is slight and the business end served substantial by the employer's conduct?
The Court's statement quoted above from Brown Food Store is the classic example
of the balancing approach. Only a further Supreme Court test can resolve this dilemma.
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devastating to union membership to be a permissible employer tactic. In
that case the balance thus was thrown in favor of employee protection. 10 6
In the lockout situation also, the equation will be crucially affected by the
legitimacy of replacements for the locked out employees.
This problem was partially resolved in NLRB v. Brown Food Store,10 7
a companion case to American Ship Building. Brown Foods was engaged
in collective bargaining negotiations as a member of a multi-employer unit.
The union struck Brown to obtain its bargaining demands, and the nonstruck employers imposed a lockout as a defense against a whipsaw strike.
Using temporary replacements, Brown continued to operate during the
strike. The other employers, seeing the consequences of Brown's operations while their plants were shut down, also replaced their locked out employees and continued production. The NLRB permitted Brown to use
temporary replacements since its employees were striking, but held that
the use of such replacements by the nonstruck employers violated both sections 8(a) (1) and (3).108 The appellate court denied enforcement on the
ground that an employer had virtually an absolute right to maintain production under the circumstances of the case.10 9 Affirming the lower court,
the Supreme Court refused to permit the Board to declare the lockout
replacement weapon unlawful through application of the balancing analysis.
In this situation, unless substantial evidence of unlawful motive was presented, the Board could not deny use of this tactic to the employer. No
finding of illegal motive was actually made by the Board, their findings
being based upon a balancing of interests and a conclusion that the tactic
carried with it its own indicia of unlawful motive. The Court denied this
latter proposition, holding that the conduct was not proscribed by the act
and carried no inherent proof of discriminatory motive. It then concluded
that the employer could, for legitimate business purposes, replace strikers
or locked out employees and blunt the effectiveness of an impending strike
by transferring work, stockpiling inventories, readjusting contract schedules or even liquidating his operation." 0
The Court thus substituted its own judgment of the efficacy and
legality of the lockout replacement weapon for that of the Board, an inappropriate function in view of its earlier and apparently conclusive statements of the scope of permissible judicial review.-"' Denying that the
Board was operating within its statutory mandate, the Court held that no
balancing could upset the conclusion that this weapon was legitimately
'o6

See text accompanying note 58 supra.

U.S. 278 (1965).
108 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
107 380

109 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963).

110 See NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) ; NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Co., 301 F.2d
886 (5th Cir. 1962).
III See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169
(1962); NLRB v. Universal Camera Co., 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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available to employers.-' The missing proof of unlawful motive, necessary to violations of both sections 8(a) (1) and (3), rendered the Board's
order unenforceable. Thus the Court denied the existence of Board discretion in this area, and reversed on the basis of the Board's "erroneous
legal foundation." 113
Again writing persuasively, Mr. Justice White dissented because he
could not agree
with the severe restrictions which the Court imposes on the
Board's role in determining the employer conduct banned by sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the NLRA . . . This decision represents a departure from the many decisions in this Court holding
that the Board has primary responsibility to weigh the interest
of employees in concerted activities against that of the employer
in operating his business." 4
It has been perceptively recognized that the function of allocating
economic weapons calls for the exercise of special expertise and awareness
of the goals and policies of the act, the strengths of the parties, the developments and stratagems in labor relations, and plant-level realities. 115
The Board is uniquely suited for this role, both in terms of its long experience in handling a truly mountainous number of unfair labor practice
cases, and in its closeness to the evidence in each individual case." 6 "The
elaborate rationalizations of the Court are calculated to confuse everyone,
including the Justices. . .
The legality of economic weapons depends
purely on pragmatic considerations, and the primary consideration has been
112 Significantly, the majority and concurring justices recognized at least one
area where the Board may use its expertise in a balancing approach in the lockout
situation. This will occur when the Board is called upon to decide if the employer's
use of permanent replacements is legitimate; the Court specifically reserved this issue.
380 U.S. at 308 n.8. Here the analysis might be appropriate: the employer had a
legitimate interest in locking out and maintaining production during the lockout by
use of replacements. His use of permanent replacements had a crushing effect upon
union membership and he might well have been able to operate using temporary
replacements. If temporary replacements had been used, the economic strikers could
have obtained reinstatement upon conclusion of the strike. See Hot Shoppes, Inc.,
146 N.L.R.B. 802 (1964). This feasible alternative would have had a less discouraging
and deleterious effect upon the protected activity. Therefore use of permanent replacements will be denied to the employer, despite the fact that they were used for a legitimate business purpose.
113 See Summers 85.
114 380 U.S. at 294 (dissenting opinion). But cf. Meltzer 109 (arguing for the
reasonableness of the Court's balancing in the case).
115 Summers 72-73.
16 The Supreme Court has noted with deference the Board's special function of
applying the general provisions of the act to the complexities of industrial life, and
has acknowledged that balancing the employer's interest in a particular decision and
method of fulfilling that decision against the injury to union membership resulting
from that conduct is a function lying "well within the mainstream" of the Board's
duties. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963); NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96-97 (1957). But see NLRB v. Brown Food Store,
380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318

(1965).
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achieving a rough equality of bargaining power." 117 Once the Board
reaches its decision on how best to attain this goal and allocates the weapons, its determination should be subject to normal judicial review with
ultimate approval or reversal accomplished by congressional action.118 It
cannot be doubted that when the Board moves into these sensitive areas
of management weapons and prerogatives, Congress will quickly become
aware of developments and engage in closer scrutiny of NLRB findings and
decisions. The statute "says nearly nothing about employers' economic
weapons in bargaining disputes; the allocation has been made by fiat of the
Board and Court." 119 If Congress disapproves of the results of the Board's
balancing processes, it will certainly be moved to redress that balance and
to enumerate criteria relating to employer weapons which are as specific
as those which it has established for judging union tactics. 2 0

III.

PROVING AN

8(a) (3)

VIOLATION IN FOUR AREAS

OF EMPLOYER ACTIVITY

A. Plant Closings and Subcontracting
In dealing with plant closings and subcontracting, courts have shown
the greatest preoccupation with protecting traditional management prerogatives from the encroachment of an expansive interpretation of the act
by the NLRB. Section 8(a) (5),121 concerned with refusals to bargain
in good faith over items considered mandatory bargaining terms by the
Board, is most often the pivotal provision in these areas, but application
and consideration of sections 8(a) (1) and (3) frequently occur.
These areas of employer conduct were vitally affected by the decisions of the Supreme Court during the 1964-1965 term.'2 In Fibreboard
PaperProds. Corp. v. NLRB,las for example, the Court held that a decision to subcontract maintenance work formerly done by employees of the
company is subject to the duty to bargain in good faith. Thus it is a viola117 Summers 72-73.
118

Bet see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98 (1960).
111 Summers 74.
120 It has been argued that "there is no reason why an employer who penalizes
his employees for engaging in union activity should be exonerated solely because he
was not motivated by the desire to discourage union membership or activity." Getman
750. This position is internally inconsistent because when an employer penalizes his
employees for engaging in union activity, his motives are clearly unlawful. Summers
has criticized the balancing analysis on the ground that any balance struck by the
Board will be changed as an industry or region changes, or when the economy shifts
(as when unemployment is high and union treasuries are low). Summers 74 n.64.
Then the effects of anti-union acts will be felt more strongly. Yet it is more than
effect which enters into the equation. It is the strength of the employer's interest in
his weapon that is crucial, as well as how close it lies to the "core of managerial
control." Moreover, the criticism fails to consider the higher goal of permitting the
Board to react to individual situations with individual responses, balances and remedies.
Uniformity is no particular virtue under this analysis.
12149 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
2 2
'
See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
=3 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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tion of section 8(a) (5) for an employer unilaterally to replace his unionized
employees with those of an independent contractor by subcontracting their
work. The Court's opinion gives an instructive analysis of the duty to
bargain, 2 4 but the remedy approved by the Court is a significant aspect of
the opinion.
The Board's remedy to redress the effects of this unfair labor practice
was an order to reinstate with backpay the employees whose jobs were
affected by the decision to subcontract. 125 The Court did not mention any
findings under sections 8(a) (1) or (3), but did enforce this section 8(a)
(3) remedy for a violation of section 8(a) (5). Of course, this was the
only effective remedy possible and the Board does possess the power to
fashion an appropriate remedy according to its expertise.126 The implications of such an approach, however, may be extremely significant. For
example, does it mean that if an employer bargains in good faith and
decides to subcontract work formerly done at his plant, his decision cannot
have the taint of an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (3) even if
layoffs and discharges follow? The reasoning would be that good faith in
bargaining is equivalent to good, economic motives for the discharge and
precludes the finding of a violation of section 8(a) (3). Thus it would be
irrelevant whether union employees were primarily or solely involved,
or whether the discharges had the requisite effect to establish a section
8(a) (1) violation. A balancing evaluation might still allow the Board
to find a violation of section 8(a) (3) in the absence of unlawful motiveif such a process were permissible. As was pointed out in a concurring opinion, Fibreboardcan be read to deny the Board the authority to make such a
finding in the subcontracting situation, since that area involves one of those
"managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control .
. .
[and] which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise . .
,,127 If this approach is accepted, what is to prevent similar
categorization and absolution from section 8(a) (3) findings of other
conduct such as the decision to close one's business, totally or partially, or
to move it to another part of the country and begin anew with nonunion
employees? The Court was faced with some of these questions in Textile
Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,' 28 but before discussing that landmark
decision, an examination of lower court and Board decisions on plant removals, closings, and subcontracting may prove helpful.
The Board has ruled that section 8(a) (3) is violated even when an
employer's decision to move his plant is motivated by business reasons,
if it is accelerated by anti-union animus so that it has a crucial and detri124 See Summers 60-63.
M 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
126 See § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) ; Note, The Need
for Creative Orders Under Section 10c of the National Labor Relations Act, 112 U.
PA. L. REv. 69 (1963).
127 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also NLRB v. Royal Plating
& Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965).
128 380 U.S. 263 (1965).

888

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.114:866

mental effect upon protected activity.12 According to the Board, even if
the union's demands add economic considerations which are taken into
account by the employer in the context of other economic factors, his decision to subcontract or to move must be made solely with reference to the
nonunion economic considerations. 13 0 This view was rejected by the Sixth
Circuit in NLRB v. Lassing,1 1 but accepted by the Tenth in NLRB v.
Brown-Dunkin Co.,' 32 a subcontracting case. Motive was determinative
there, with the court supporting the Board's finding that the union's successful organizational campaign precipitated the employer's decision to
subcontract the operation done by the new union adherents. In this con13 3
text, purely economic motives could not be claimed by the employer.
Similarly, where the employer reclassified all his employees as a result of a
union election victory, the court found that this response in retribution
for the protected activity violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3) "so long as
that action would not have been taken in the absence of such union
1
activity. . ... "34
Some courts place an even heavier burden upon the Board by holding
that the employer may consider the advent of the union as one of the factors
upon which to base a decision concerning removal of the plant or subcontracting of an operation, and that his "real" or "true" motive must be
both discriminatory and designed to discourage union membership to
violate section 8(a) (3). In NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc.,ias for example,
the employer was considering moving his plant for economic reasons.
When the union later gained majority status and demanded collective
bargaining after Board certification, the employer made his decision to
relocate. Much evidence of anti-union hostility was introduced, and the
Board held that regardless of economic necessity, the move was accelerated
-thus motivated in some part-by anti-union animus. The appellate court
refused to accept this test, and insisted instead upon a showing that antiunion hostility was the preponderant motive for the decision.' 3 6
129 See 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 112 (1963).
In the Board's view, an employer's
conduct is unlawful even if genuine economic factors as well as the employees' union
activities contribute motivation for the shutdown. See Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B.

678 (1963); 28 NLRB ANN. RFP. 76 (1964).
130 See, e.g., Bonnie Lass Knitting Mills, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1960) ; Barber

Iron Foundry, 126 N.L.R.B. 30 (1960).
131284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961).
132287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961).
133 Id. at 19-20. See also Bon Hennings Logging Co. v. NLRB, 308 F2d 548
(9th Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961) ;
NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. E. C. Brown Co., 184 F.2d
829 (2d Cir. 1950)-in each a finding of anti-union motive for the shutdown or subcontracting was pivotal and determinative.
'34 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 1947).
See
also Federation of Union Representatives v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 1964).
135 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
136Id. at 175; see NLRB v. Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826, 831 (6th Cir. 1963);
NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1962) ; jays Foods, Inc.
v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.,
211 F.2d 848, 854 (5th Cir. 1954).
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The implications for the plant closing situation of the Supreme Court's
decision on subcontracting in FibreboardPaper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB
are well illustrated in the Adams Dairy case.M7 In 1962, the NLRB trial
examiner found violations of sections 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) when the
employer decided to substitute an independent contractor and his employees
for his own driver-salesmen in this milk distributing business. The Board
found it unnecesary to pass upon the section 8(a) (3) charge since the
employer clearly violated section 8(a) (5), in the Board's view, by refusing
to bargain before he subcontracted the operation. The employer was
ordered to reinstate his employees with backpay and to bargain about the
decision to subcontract.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the decision was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, and that the refusal to negotiate with the
union before taking this step was therefore not violative of the act. The
court pointed out, however, that if there had been evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding of discriminatory motive it would have affirmed on the
basis of a section 8(a) (3) violation. 3 8 The court admitted that Radio
Officers' permits application of the presumption of motive test in the section
8(a) (3) context, but maintained that this applied only when the employer's
act is inherently discriminatory and has no rational explanation other than
motivation by anti-union animus. Superseniority in Erie Resistor was
such a situation; subcontracting is not. Thus, since the Board failed to
produce evidence of the employer's unlawful motive, the Board applied the
wrong standard and was reversed. Had the Board anticipated the Supreme Court's disposition of the Burnup & Sis case, it could have found
that the employer's conduct interfered with activity protected by section 7
of the act and sustained the finding of a violation with the same remedy
under section 8(a) (1).
When ordered by the Supreme Court to rehear the case in light of its
Fibreboardopinion, 139 the Eighth Circuit affirmed its former decision. 140
Fibreboard's subcontracting of maintenance work was compared to Adams
Dairy's replacement of driver-salesmen by independent contractors. The
court limited Fibreboard's duty to bargain to those situations in which
work contracted out continues to be done as part of the employer's in-plant
operation. In Adams Dairy, on the other hand, the entire distribution
portion of the employer's enterprise was terminated. To require the employer to bargain over such a decision was held improper since it would
"significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business," 141 even though
his decision would most assuredly terminate employment and discourage
union activity discriminatorily. 14
N.L.R.B. 815 (1962).
322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963).
139 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 379 U.S. 644 (1965) (per curiam).
140 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
14IFibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213, 221-23 (1964).
142 Id. at 221-23 (concurring opinion).
137137
138
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It is here that subcontracting and plant closings merge, for both are
decisions "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." It is in this
context that the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co.14 becomes of primary importance. As part of an allegedly
single, integrated employer group, Darlington Company was controlled
by Deering Milliken, a marketing corporation. When the union organized
its plant, Darlington was liquidated and closed. Because the Board found
that the closing was due to the employer's anti-union hostility and thus
violated section 8(a) (3), it ordered the employer to reinstate the discharged employees if the plant were ever reopened and to continue their
wages until they found substantially equivalent employment. 14 The appellate court refused enforcement on the ground that an employer has an
absolute right, regardless of his anti-union and discriminatory motivation,
to terminate all or part of his operation. 14
Although it held impermissible a partial closing motivated by a discriminatory desire to discourage union organization, the Supreme Court did
agree that an employer had an absolute right to close his entire operation,
even where evidence of discriminatory motive is clear. Writing for the
Court, Mr. Justice Harlan insisted that where there is a total liquidation,
the employer receives no future benefit from his action in the form of
decreased pressure from his employees to exercise their protected rights.
Thus such conduct is "not the type of discrimination which is prohibited
by the Act." 146 On the other hand, a discriminatory partial closing has
repercussions upon the remainder of the employer's business and employees, whether in the same plant or another plant controlled by the same
employer. Thus, "a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)
(3) if it is motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining
plants of the single employer and if the employer may reasonably have
foreseen that such a closing would likely have that effect." 147 Apparently
the latter clause of the dual test is superfluous, for even the most myopic
employer could foresee the effect upon his remaining employees of wholesale or selective discriminatory discharges. But though the employer could
foresee this effect, even as the natural consequence of his action, he is
not held to have intended this result without proof of unlawful motive.
Under the Radio Officers' test of intending the natural and foreseeable
consequences of the act, the Erie Resistor balancing analysis, or the inherently discriminatory approach, a section 8(a) (3) violation might be sustained in the total closing context. Apparently, since this is an area "which
trenches so closely upon otherwise legitimate employer prerogative," the
Court requires substantial proof of unlawful motive to order enforcement
48
of a Board decision finding the act violated.'
143 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
144 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 255 (1962).

325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
146
4 7 380 U.S. at 271.
148 Id. at 275.
1 Id. at 276; see Summers 64-66.
145
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Transplanted to the subcontracting cases, the same partial-total dichotomy will apply.1 49 In Adams Dairy, this analysis would require a
finding that a termination through subcontracting of a part of the employer's operation had occurred. The employer no longer handled this
distribution function from his plant; he did not merely shift the operation
to another group of employees still ostensibly connected with him. Thus
where the control over a portion of his operation is totally severed, if the
employer fulfills the requirement of bargaining in good faith before subcontracting, he will not be guilty of a section 8(a) (3) violation if that good
faith suffices to demonstrate lack of unlawful motive. This is so although
the effect of this decision on other employees in the plant is naturally and
obviously detrimental to union membership and participation.
The Court's approach in Darlington is seriously deficient. In focussing upon the gain to the employer rather than the loss and injury to the
employee the Court overlooked its own declaration in Radio Officers' that
section 8(a) (3) was intended to insulate employees' jobs from the possible
effects of exercising their organizational rights. As one commentator has
noted:
We had always supposed that the purpose of the statute was
affirmatively to protect employees in the exercise of their rights,
not merely to preclude employers from profiting from destruction
of those rights. Indeed, the dominant remedial principle, particularly in Section 8(a) (3) violations has always been to make
the injured employees whole and not merely to deprive the employer of his ill-gotten gains. . .. 0 The mischief in the Court's
reasoning is that it ignores the rights of those who have been
discriminatorily discharged. . . . [The Darlington Court's reasoning implied that] discrimination against them is an evil only
when it intimidates others .... 151
Certainly the effect upon the employees in Darlington was devastatingthey lost their jobs, they were discriminated against, and their organizational activity protected by the act was discouraged. Should the Darlington total-partial closing approach be applied in the subcontracting context,
it would be just as clearly incorrect. The employer could evade his duty
to recognize a majority union and could discharge union adherents solely
for the purpose of "chilling unionism," if he merely bargained with the
union over his subcontracting decision, refused to compromise, and subcontracted a portion of his operation as a warning to other union adherents
that they might be next.
149 Cf. NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th
Cir. 1965) (the employer terminated one portion of his operation).
150 To support this contention, the author cites Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
51

'-

Summers 65, 67.
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To analogize the decision to subcontract an operation to the decision
to close an entire plant is to misconstrue the act. The decision to subcontract does not approach the magnitude of termination of an entire
enterprise, nor is it as difficult to remedy effectively. It is, instead, analogous to a decision to terminate one plant in an integrated chain of plants.
A discriminatory partial closing or subcontracting "may have repercussions
on what remains of the business, affording employer leverage for discouraging the free exercise of § 7 rights among remaining employees of much the
same kind as that found to exist in the 'runaway shop' and 'temporary
closing' cases." 152 The employer's decision to subcontract, whether retaining the function in his plant or totally severing control, must be susceptible to the same tests of a section 8(a) (3) violation as are applied to other
conduct covered by that section. Remedies which order reinstatement of
the discharged employees in the retained portions of the business are available, as is backpay until similar employment is obtained. If solicitude for
management prerogatives makes it necessary to declare the balancing test
inapplicable in the total closing situation, 5 3 this should be the only freedom
from scrutiny allowed the employer, for the act so dictates.
B. Strike Replacements
The use of strike replacements is so far institutionalized and anticipated
in industrial relations that it is surprising that any limitation on their use
has been imposed by the courts. Long ago, the Board determined that
maintenance of operations during a strike was an inalienable employer
right;15 in Brown Food Store this right was extended to include the
option of an employer to continue operations during his own lockout. "The
right to hire permanent replacements for [economic] strikers was based
simply on the Board's practical judgment that employers should be allowed
this countermeasure to the strike." 155 That the Board made such a judgment so early in its history demonstrates that it has long been allocating
economic weapons between employer and union. Surely use of permanent
replacements effectively discourages concerted activity-the union faces
the threat of loss of membership, although its collective bargaining contract
may remain in effect, any time it takes to the lines to reinforce bargaining
380 U.S. at 274-75.
Id. at 275. It would be unreasonable to argue for an across the board application of the balancing analysis. As the opinion in Darlington indicated, in situations
of total closings the employer has made a judgment that he wishes to withdraw his
capital and entrepreneurial skill completely. The act does not extend the Board's
supervisory functions far enough to investigate this decision unless it is like a temporary closing or a runaway shop, in which the employer closes and reopens with nonunion employees, in which case violations of § 8(a) (3) should be able to be proved
under the tests discussed. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324,
327 (6th Cir. 1955); Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enforced per
curiam, 305 F.2d 825' (3d Cir. 1962).
154Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201 (1936), enforcement denied, 87
F.2d 611, 92 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
155 Summers 73.
152
3
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or other economic demands. In making its judgment, the Board considered
the alternatives available to the employer, the legitimacy and effect of his
interest in keeping production lines operating during the strike and determined that the balance lay with the employer. 15 6
This frank balancing approach has pervaded every situation where
replacements have been used. According to one analysis, the decisions
which grant the employer the right to hire replacements for strikers but
not the right to give them superseniority,157 and which afford an opportunity to replace during bargaining, economic or operational lockouts, but
apparently deny the replacements permanent status have no internal consistency 5 8s These decisions can be rationalized, however, on the basis
that in drawing these lines the Board and Court "looked to the relative
effectiveness of the parties' economic weapons and defined their legality
to prevent what it judged would create an imbalance of power." 15 9 Allocation of the right to use replacements to maintain operations and of the
further right to offer these replacements permanent positions is subject to
shifting considerations in varying situations. These considerations might
include the context in which the replacements are to be used, the nature of
the operation and the skills required to perform it, the sources of new
manpower, the geographical location of the business, and the relative
strength of the union and the employer.
In American Ship Building and Brown Food Store, the Court either
neglected to consider these factors or failed to expose its analysis; it
concluded only that temporarily replacing locked out employees is neither
clear evidence of unlawful motive nor such an inherent interference with
protected activities that it will support a finding of a section S(a) (3)
violation without proof of discriminatory motive. Under the balancing
analysis, the Court might well have come to the same conclusion, for use
of temporary replacements is the most minimally destructive action the
employer can take once his right to operate during the lockout is accepted.
It has been argued that:
Since the hiring of temporary replacements as a complement to a
legitimate bargaining lockout no more violates the act than does
the bargaining lockout itself, and since management should be
allowed to protect its legitimate interest in maintaining operations,
the institution of temporary replacements should not prima facie
constitute an unfair labor practice.80
This analysis can be carried a step further. In the Court's view, not only
is the use of temporary replacements not inherently discriminatory, but it
156 See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201 (1936).
157 See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
15 8 Summers 72-73.
11509 Id. at 73.
6 Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 366, 370 (1966).
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cannot place weight on the scales which would enable the Board to find that
the lockout-temporary replacement weapon is violative of section 8(a) (3)
in some cases. The Court sees the problem as involving another of those
"core of managerial control" decisions where actual proof of discriminatory
motive is necessary for a finding of violation. It is submitted that this
rationale is unacceptable. The threat of temporary replacements, when
combined with the crucially effective weapon of the bargaining lockout,
cumulatively can cripple union membership and participation. For example, when employees know that their union's bargaining demands can
be met by a lockout and discharges, they not only will be less vigorous
adherents, but are likely to renounce their membership. Thus the Board
should have the authority to balance the countervailing considerations in
the context of the individual situation in order to determine the legality of
this dual weapon.
Similarly, use of permanent replacements in these situations can serve
the same legitimate economic functions and be motivated by the same
"core" business considerations as the use of temporary replacements.' 6 '
As yet the Court has not recognized this. In both Brown Food Store and
American Ship Building it reserved judgment on this weapon,1 62 but the
concurring Justices in the former case expressed grave doubts that use of
permanent replacements can ever be justified by any argument of legitimate financial interest on the part of nonstruck but locking-out employers.
Perhaps the work or location of the plant are so unattractive that only an
offer of permanent employment is an effective inducement to an applicant,
or the labor supply such that an offer of permanent employment is the only
effective method of recruitment. All these legitimate employer concerns
must be weighed in the balance. The concurring opinions in Brown Food
Store seem to prevent such balancing in the case of a single employer lockout or where the multi-employer unit moves past the conduct needed to
preserve the unit's cohesiveness. Such limitations appear unwise, for use
of permanent replacements in these situations is neither inherently prejudicial nor so devoid of significant economic justification as to dispense with
specific proof of discriminatory motive or to prevent a frank balancing
decision on the future use of the weapon.'6 Each plant situation must be
examined in its individual context. The result of the balancing may differ
with area and operation. When the employer can anticipate that his conduct will be scrutinized if he decides to use the lockout replacement weapon,
he will be forced to examine the alternatives available to him to achieve his
legitimate objectives. Knowledge of the Board's balancing approach should
then lead him to choose the solution which will, consistent with his legitimate needs, inflict the least injury upon protected activities and union
membership.
161 See id. at 370 n.40.
NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 292 n.6 (1965); NLRB v.
American Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. 300, 308 n.8 (1965).
163 See id. at 311-12.
,
162
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C. Bonuses
The problem of bonus treatment of unionized employees often arises
in a context of section 8(a) (5) charges. Typically, the union claims that
the employer had agreed to continue paying a customary bonus after the
union achieved its majority recognitional status, but that it had negotiated
e
a contract which did not specifically require continuance of the bonus.16
The usual bonus situation giving rise to a section 8(a) (3) charge is
that in which the employer grants a bonus to his non-union employees but
effectively denies it to his union workers on the basis of some apparently
nondiscriminatory formula, or refuses to pay a heretofore regular bonus to
newly organized employees. The pivotal problem is categorization of the
practice. 65 Is it like grants of superseniority, with proof of discriminatory
motive not required; is it analogous to plant closings where even proof of
discriminatory motive will not support a violation of section 8(a) (3) ; or
is it like those lockouts and discharges in which proof of motive is first
sought, but absent such proof, a balancing of interests will determine if
there has been a violation?
In Pittsburgh-DesMoines Steel Co. v. NLRB,0 6 the employer applied
a five factor formula for bonus determination to several of his plants. All
his employees received a Christmas bonus except the unionized employees
at a California plant which had undergone a strike. Since one of the factors
in the bonus formula was group productivity, the strike time reduced the
productivity of the plant to a point below that which qualified the employees
for the bonus. Despite the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory
motive, the Board applied the natural and foreseeable consequences testinferring discouragement and presuming intent-to sustain the section
8(a) (3) allegations. The Board acknowledged the absolute right of an
employer to declare or withhold a bonus for business reasons, but insisted
that the act was violated if this discretion were exercised in a way which
inherently penalized strikers and contained a built in bias against this protected activity.'67
The circuit court reversed, holding that even if the action were discriminatory and carried with it a natural and foreseeable effect of discouraging union membership, section 8(a) (3) was not violated unless the
employer's action was clearly motivated by a desire to accomplish this
result rather than to fulfill a legitimate business function. The Court held
the Radio Officers' presumption was inapplicable since the denial of the
164 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) ; Wollett, The Duty to Bargain Over
the "Unwritten" Terns and Conditions of Employment, 36 TEXAS L. REv. 863 (1958).
6 See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co. 339 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1965) (treated
solely as a § 8(a) (5) case); General Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.
1964) (no allegation of § 8(a) (3) violation) ; NLRB v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326 F.2d
501 (5th Cir. 1964) (§ 8(a)(3) violation not found because of lack of evidence as
to anti-union motive).
106284 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960), reversing 124 N.L.R.B. 855 (1959).
167 124 N.L.R.B. at 857-58 & n.6.
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bonus was not based solely on union membership. Since the employer
proved a legitimate business reason for his denial (productivity of his employees), and since he had an absolute right to grant or to withhold the
bonus (like the right to close his plant), the balancing equation test was
inapplicable; the offense could only be proved through evidence of motive.
Strict application of the American Ship Building and Brown Food
Store requirements, apparently anticipated by the appellate court in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel,""" would require the Board to produce substantial
evidence of the employer's unlawful motivation from the complex of motives
which undoubtedly underlie such a decision, and would run counter to prior
Board practice. 169
An indication that the courts understand this requirement to be the
law today is found in the Quality Casting case.' 70 There the NLRB held
that an employer's profit sharing plan which provided for forfeiture based
on a certain percentage of unexcused absences violated the act. (Strike
time was considered as unexcused absence.)
Certainly the threat of loss
of proceeds from their profit sharing plan, like the loss of bonus pay, effectively discouraged participation in concerted activities. However, the reviewing court refused to enforce the Board's order, which was based on a
Radio Officers' and balancing analysis, and denied the legitimacy of such a
balancing equation based on considerations of the strength of the employer's
interest in cutting down on absenteeism by use of this particular method.
The court insisted:
We are of the opinion that when, as in this case, an employer's
action is not specifically directed against those who have engaged
in protected types of union activity, but is rather directed at a
group which is defined by other than union membership or activity
criteria, and which clearly includes others who did not engage in
the protected, concerted activities, the Board not only must prove
7
discrimination but also it must prove the employer's motivation.' '
Thus through use of a restrictive reading of "discrimination" and an insistence upon explicit proof of motive, the courts have insulated such conduct from a balancing evaluation by the BoardV'
168 "The Act has always permitted the employer to infringe on employees' rights
when the infringement is motivated by a desire to protect rights which are legitimately the employer's." 284 F.2d at 83.
169 Previously, in situations involving bonuses or participation in profit sharing
plans and salary schedules conditioned upon nonunion membership, the Board has
made consistent findings of per se violations and inherent discrimination carrying
its own proof of motive. See Melville Confections, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1334 (1963),
enforced, 327 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1964); Toffenetti Restaurant Co., 136 N.L.R.B.
1156, enforced, 311 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1962); Jim O'Donnell Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1639,
1643 (1959) ; General Motors Corp., 59 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1155 (1944).
170 Quality Casting Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 982 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F2d
36 (6th Cir. 1963).
1 325 F.2d at 41.
172 See, e.g., National Seal Div., 141 N.L.R.B. 661 (1963), enforcement denied,
336 F2d 781 (9th Cir. 1964); Community Shops, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1522 (1961),
enforcement denied, 301 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1962).
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This analysis and insistence is unsatisfactory. Here there is a clear
clash of conflicting legitimate interests-the employer who seeks high productivity and institutes a bonus or profit sharing plan as an incentive, and
the employees and union which have a protected right to concerted activity
and union membership. Crucially, it is the very exercise of those rights
which would disqualify the employees from participating in the extra pay
plans. It cannot be said that "the resulting harm to employee rights is
thus comparatively slight, and a substantial and legitimate business end
is served," so that the employer's conduct is prima facie lawful until proof
of his improper motivation is presented."
Injury to union membership
is substantial; the employer's legitimate interest in productivity may well
be substantial also.174
Such a situation is particularly appropriate for examination under a
balancing analysis. The balancing approach would permit freer inquiry
into the usefulness and effect of this employer act in the individual plant
context. It would also permit fuller expression of the "special solicitude"
which the act has for the right to strike; 175 for in certain situations the
desire to protect this concerted conduct may overbalance the right of the
employer to apply a formula such as that in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel
in determining payment of bonus benefits. Finally, use of the balancing
test is appropriate because the bonus and profit sharing situations resemble
the lockout, superseniority, replacement, and discharge areas, where, it is
submitted, the balancing tests are either already in use or are proper situations for the exercise of the Board's functions. Unlike total plant closings,
withdrawal of a bonus has a markedly discouraging effect upon the unionized employees who continue to work at the plant, as well as upon nonunion employees contemplating union membership. Unless the recent
Anzerican Ship Building and Brown Food Store decisions are unwisely
read to require findings of unlawful motive in all section 8(a) (1) and (3)
cases and to foreclose the Board from exercising an "arbitral role" in any
situation involving these sections, use of the balancing approach is not
foreclosed in these bonus and profit sharing cases.
D. Lockouts
Until the recent Supreme Court decisions in American Ship Building
and Brown Food Store, the lockout area provided a notable example of the
173 NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 289 (1965).
174 Under a Burnup & Sims approach, § 8(a) (1) might be used here since the
denial of the bonus is conditioned upon nonparticipation in union activities, and thus has
the requisite detrimental effect to warrant findings of a § 8(a) (1) violation. However, there is good reason to anticipate that the usefulness of Burnup & Sims will be
severely limited. Not only did the Court indicate that it would limit the case's theory
to factual situations like that in Burmep & Sims but in later cases courts have indicated
that they would also apply a motive requirement to proof of § 8(a) (1) allegations.
See, e.g., NLRB v. D'Armigene, Inc., 353 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1965) (relying upon the
Brown Food Store-Ainerican Ship Building analysis).
175 See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963); NLRB v.

American Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. 300, 323 (1965).
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Board's use of the balancing approach under section 8(a) (3) *176 When the
courts examined the history of the act and found that the legislature had
no intention of making the lockout a per se violation, 1 77 they began to
employ a balancing and motive test in determining whether lockouts constituted violations of the act.178 The legality of the lockout was governed
by an offensive-defensive dichotomy. Where an employer feared economic
or operative disruption by a reasonable expectation of an impending strike,
he could engage in a legitimate defensive lockout. 179 Similarly, he could
act defensively to protect the integrity of a multi-employer bargaining unit
by locking out against a whipsaw strike. 80 He could not, however, unreasonably anticipate a strike or difficulty in collective bargaining and offensively lock out the employees so as to exert pressure on them to accept
his terms.181
The Buffalo Linen case ' 82 is the primary example of the development
of this balancing analysis. Buffalo Linen Company was a member of a
multi-employer bargaining group. During negotiations with the union, it
was struck. To prevent the union from striking one member company at a
time, thus forcing that company to accede to its demands to preserve its
position in the market, the members of the association met these whipsawing tactics by locking all their doors. The NLRB held that this was
a normal defensive move against the strike of one of their member companies which imperiled the employers' common interest in bargaining on a
group basis. The Second Circuit reversed,' 83 holding that such a determination was for the legislature and that, since it found no justification in
the legitimate business and economic interests of the other employers in
the lockout, the locking out of nonstriking employees interfered with their
right to engage or refrain from engaging in concerted activity. Thus the
lockout discriminated against them because of their union's actions. Ordering enforcement of the Board's decision, the Supreme Court indicated that
it approved of the Board's balancing of the conflicting interests since there
176 See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
17 7 See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 314-15 (1965).
178 See Meltzer, Lockouts under the L.M.R.A., 28 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 614 (1961):

Meltzer, Single-Employer & Multi-Employer Lockouts wuder the Taft-Hartley Act,
24 U. CHI. L. REv. 70 (1956).
'79 Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334, 337 (1958),
enforced, 270
F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959). See also Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
180 NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); Morand Bros. Beverage
Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), reversing 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950);
Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th
Cir. 1953).
18 Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n, 126 N.L.R.B. 973 (1960),
enforced, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961) ; Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130 N.L.R.B.
1122 (1961) (dictum); International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951) (dictum);
Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (dictum).
82
'
Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
83 Truck Drivers Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353
U.S. 87 (1957).
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were legitimate and substantial interests on both sides. 84 Since there was
no finding of unlawful motivation, the Board correctly understood its function and could legitimately hold that the defensive lockout outweighed the
union's interest and injury.
The Board had been making similar determinations since 1951, when
it recognized in Betts Cadillac18 5 that the defensive lookout was a legitimate weapon when "necessary for the avoidance of economic loss or business disruption attendant upon a strike." 186 Reasonableness under the
circumstances became the Board's standard to determine whether a lockout
was defensive. 8 7 What the Board in fact was doing under this test was
balancing the legitimacy and strength of the employer's reasonable interest
in the lockout maneuver against the necessarily detrimental effect upon
union participation.
The vitality of this approach has been placed in serious doubt by the
Supreme Court majorities in American Ship Building and Brown Food
Store. If under these cases it is determined that the Board is injecting
itself into management functions in determining the reasonableness of a
lockout, so that a finding of discriminatory motive is required to sustain
a section 8(a) (3) allegation, the cases in which the Board explored the
justification for the employer's expectation of a strike will come under
strong attack. Indeed, even before the recent Supreme Court decisions,
the motive test was strictly reasserted in several circuit court opinions in
the lockout area. 88
In American Ship Building, the fact that there was no indication "that
the lockout . . . [would] necessarily destroy the unions' capacity for

effective and responsible representation" weighed heavily in the Court's
analysis. 89 Despite this and other indications in concurring and dissenting
opinions that the balancing evaluation is appropriate in this context, 90
the Court apparently believes that the lockout is an illegitimate tactic only
when the Board finds substantial evidence of an "intention to discourage
union membership or otherwise discriminate against the union." '9: Why
this form of economic self-help is not always susceptible to a reasonable
balancing analysis by the NLRB is explained only by the Court's judgment that "sections 8(a) (1) and (3) do not give the Board a general
authority to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the
184353 U.S. at 95-96; NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 282 (1965).
185
Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
1
86Id.at 286.
87
'
See 26 NLRB ANN. REP. 96-97 (1962).
188 See, e.g., NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 897-98 (5th
Cir. 1962); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.Zd 576, 583-84 (7th Cir.

1951).

189 380 U.S. at 309.

190 See NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 294, 298-99 (1965) (White,
J., dissenting); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 323-27 (1965)
(White, J., concurring); id. at 338-41 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (all the above
passages approve the Board's function in balancing the competing legitimate interests
generally, and specifically in the lockout situation).
19 380 U.S. at 313.
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bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party or the other because
of its assessment of that party's bargaining power." 192 The Court would
limit the Board's functions to "protecting the rights of employee organization and collective bargaining." ' 9 3 This function and the balancing approach are not incompatible. To best fulfill the mandate as interpreted
by the Court, the Board should be allowed the balancing method of assessing the legitimacy of the employer's interest in the lockout and the
concomitant injury to employee organization and collective bargaining.
92

Id. at 317.
193 Ibid.
1

